

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

November 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

SUBJECT: Task Group Report (Alternative Management Arrangements For the New Photographic Search and Surveillance System)

In response to your October 27 request for an appraisal of the above report, comments are offered in two categories: the collective views of senior members of the NRO Staff (sans me); and my personal opinions on both NRO Staff views and the report itself.

I asked appropriate senior members of the Staff (Worthman, Carter, Howard, Buzard, and Koch) to give me their completely candid thoughts. A summary of their more pertinent views follows:

1. The casual discarding, in the report, of the fully integrated System Project Office because "...the Agreement reflects an obvious desire to maintain organizational identity and responsibility..." was "deplorable" and "distressing" to them. They felt this approach to management was the only valid one for a complex system development, and all alternatives proposed were, in effect, committee-management with all inherent weaknesses. They cited numerous examples of successes for the former, and failures for the latter, and felt the new search system was far more important than any organizational status or recognition.

2. In short, the Staff believes that you must have a single, authoritative, responsive System Project Director, and should establish a fully-integrated System Project Office (which co-locates all necessary CIA-DOD engineering, procurement, and security people in one office, and empowers these people to speak authoritatively for their "sponsors"). Although the Staff believes the overwhelming management capability to do the job is in SAFSP, they profess not to be anti-CIA, since they also assert that total system assignment to CIA

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would be vastly more effective than the "idealistic but impractical social ventures" proposed in the report.

Personally, I basically agree with the Staff on the desirability and effectiveness of a fully integrated SPO--the management alternatives to this approach are inherently weak, are potential trouble-makers, will require more of your attention, etc. However, I am not so positive as they that it is the "only" valid approach. Further, I am convinced the Agreement precludes a fully integrated SPO (as defined in the Report), since it repeatedly refers to "the CIA" and "the DOD" (or AF), not CIA-provided people, DOD-provided people, etc. In that vein, the Agreement specifically states "The CIA will develop the optical sensor sub-system." Therefore we must establish some compromise arrangement which assigns logical responsibilities for system tasks and specific sub-systems to SAFSP and CIA-OSP as organizational entities.

So much for the Staff views and my reactions thereto. Next, I should like to give you my personal views on the Report (as objectively as possible, but undoubtedly prejudiced by my role in its preparation):

1. I repeat my strong personal desire for the fully integrated SPO approach, but reluctantly must recommend against your selecting it in view of the apparent intent and the specifics of the Agreement.

2. I do recommend we try the so-called Segregated SPO approach, with overall system responsibility (and SPD) assigned to SAFSP. The Deputy SPD should be a CIA employee assigned to SAFSP (with no allegiance, per se, to CIA for the duration of such assignment) for this purpose. Additionally, an Assistant Project Director (APD) for CIA FOSS activities must be appointed. All CIA FOSS activities should be consolidated under this senior CIA representative who is responsible and responsive to appropriate project direction of the SPD. Both SAFSP and CIA-OSP must exercise considerable restraint in dealing with this individual.

3. I believe SAFSP is the only logical choice for overall system responsibility, and to provide the SPD, on the basis of personnel skills and experience, and personnel resources available to them. In the middle management field, CIA has virtually no one (other than Crowley and Ledford) with

system management experience and background. There are many such people in SAFSP or AFSC. If total system responsibility for FOSS should be assigned to CIA-OSP, then I recommend an experienced Air Force Colonel or Brigadier General be assigned to CIA as the SPD.


4. I have very firm convictions on the matter of co-location. There is no question about the necessity for co-locating a "line" DSPD, and I recommend the same for the APD (plus an appropriate portion of his office). Coordination and interface would, at best, be quite difficult if the SPD/DSPD and the APD were 2500 miles apart--particularly so, for the first year or so.

5. With regard to the responsibility of the APD, I believe CIA-OSP should be charged with the Sensor Module as defined in the Management Report. The prime reason for this is that it will enhance the Government's ability to hold the camera contractor responsible for the key factors associated with proper camera functioning (i.e., mounting and alignment, thermal control, critical film handling, peculiar electronics and pneumatics, etc).

6. The Technical Evaluation Group proposed that the sensor source selection include the camera sub-system and a combined Sensor/RV module (as one unit). Although this is a third option in the Management Report, I recommend against it for several reasons. First, these are in fact two separate modules (different types of structures--monocoque vs truss; different thermal requirements, etc) and will be built as such, in any event. The interface between the two modules--for example, in film path alignment--is not nearly as critical as the Technical Group imagines. Last, I do not wish to foster--unless there are overriding reasons--another CORONA "environment". Assigning CIA everything forward of the OCV would almost parallel the CORONA Program and encourage the same kinds of management problems we have today (only more serious, because concurrent sub-system development is involved in FOSS). Therefore, since the RV Module (see Management Report definition) is a separate element, its development responsibility should be assigned to SAFSP.

7. I believe the Management Report recommendation that the OCV contractor also build the sensor module shell and RV module (in effect, the entire spacecraft sans payload), and be the system integrator, is most significant. Hopefully, despite split responsibilities among Government Agency/Department, this will facilitate system engineering, structural integrity, and simplify interface matters. This contractor should design and build the sensor module shell and deliver it to the camera contractor for camera sub-system integration and test.

8. Lastly, an early selection of the system engineer (whatever management approach is selected) is vital to the work of the three Source Selection Task Groups. I question that these groups could do an effective job in the absence of the overall detailed specifications which the SE must provide. I urge the designation of the organization responsible for the SE at the earliest possible date.



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